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Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology:
A Gaping Disconnect?
John J. Delaney*
PROLOGUE
“The law of vested rights and estoppel must strike a fine balance
between the competing interests of the developer and the
municipality. A developer needs some protection from changes in
land use requirements that prevent him from completing his project
or that make completion more expensive. Municipalities need the
freedom to revise their land use requirements to meet new land use
problems or to implement new land use policies.” 1
INTRODUCTION
From time immemorial, or at least since Hadacheck v. Sebastian,2
courts have wrestled, often unsuccessfully, with the uneasy task of
striking this “fine balance” when newly adopted land use laws or
regulations are applied retroactively against ongoing development
projects. The result has been a hodgepodge of ad hoc analyses giving
rise to rules based mostly on subjective standards and providing little
in the way of reliable guidance to landowners and agencies involved
in the development process. Even worse, case law provided mostly
by state courts over the past quarter-century is generally insensitive to
the uncertainties faced by landowners who must cope with an
increasingly complex land use approval process. Doubters need only
* AICP. Founding partner of the law firm of Linowes and Blocher LLP in Silver Spring,
Maryland, where he has practiced since 1965. Mr. Delaney teaches Land Use Regulation as a
member of the adjunct faculty at American University’s Washington College of Law in
Washington, D.C., and is also a member of the ALI-ABA Land Use Institute faculty.
1. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.12 (4th ed. 1997).
2. 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (The Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the
manufacturer of bricks in certain residential areas, even though an existing brick yard’s removal
caused severe loss to the owners.).
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familiarize themselves with the travails endured by Bernadine Suitum
and the Del Monte Dunes Development Group on their recent
sojourns to the United States Supreme Court.3 In particular, most
vesting decisions fail to even acknowledge the critical differences
between a single building project and long-term multi-building
developments, including planned unit developments, which are
subject to numerous regulatory reviews and approvals before
obtaining their first building permit.4
The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the anomalies
arising from the disjointed body of case law on vested rights,
particularly as they affect phased developments. An Appendix is
provided setting forth the development chronology, with selected
court rulings at each step along the way to demonstrate the disparate
nature of vesting jurisprudence.
But first, we relate the story of three mythical property owners
whose experiences with the law of vested rights may help foster a
deeper understanding of the problem.
“THE GREAT TERRAIN ROBBERY”
A TWO ACT PLAY FEATURING LORRAINE LUCKY, PAUL PLODDER
AND QUALITY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
ACT ONE
Lorraine Lucky
Lorraine Lucky, a homebuilder, acquired a recorded single-family
residential lot in the Pristine Acres area of Suburban County in the
State of Euphoria. It is the last unimproved lot of what was a 3-lot
subdivision which is now fully developed, i.e., subdivision streets,
sewer and water and utilities are all in place. Lucky paid $100,000.00
for the lot and applied to Suburban County for a building permit for a
duplex dwelling (two dwelling units), as permitted under existing
3. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
4. See Avco Community Developers, Inc., v. South Coast Regional Comm’n, 553 P.2d
546 (Cal. 1976), a leading case on vested rights.
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zoning. The costs and filing fees were $7,000. The building permit
was issued, but two weeks later the newly elected Suburban County
Council enacted a “Revised Zoning Ordinance” (“RZO”) which,
among other things, prevented duplex residences in all single-family
residential zones. By this time, Lucky had commenced construction
of footings for the duplex units.
Paul Plodder
Meanwhile, just a few blocks away from Lucky’s lot, Paul
Plodder, a small homebuilder, has nearly completed development of
his 5-lot residential subdivision in Pristine Acres. He had finished
grading and paving the subdivision street in front of his lots and was
installing sewer and water connections pursuant to County-issued
permits. Several months ago, after conducting due diligence in which
he confirmed that under applicable zoning ten duplex units could be
built on the five lots and that the lots had received preliminary
subdivision plan approval, Paul purchased the lots for $400,000.00.
His engineering costs for obtaining record plat approval, requisite
permits for required street, utility and stormwater management
improvements, together with construction costs for these facilities,
amounted to $200,000.00. Building permit applications had been
filed with Suburban County two months behind schedule due to an
unexplained delay in issuing sewer and water permits. As of the date
of enactment of the RZO, no building permits had been issued to
Plodder, nor had he received any building permits or commenced any
construction of the planned duplexes.
Quality Development Company
On the date that Suburban County enacted the RZO, Quality
Development Company (“Quality”) was heavily involved in
development activity for Phase 2 of its approved 500-acre mixed use
residential community in the Flower Valley area of Suburban County.
Quality had acquired the land over a decade ago, after the County had
adopted a new master plan designating the property for “planned
community residential-mixed use” development. A new zoning cate-
gory was created by the County Council to accommodate the
proposed PUD at an overall density of five dwelling units per acre,
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for a total of 1,300 single-family detached residences, 600 attached
dwellings (duplexes or townhomes) and 600 apartment units. A 15-
acre community shopping center was also authorized. The master
plan and zoning ordinance called for set-asides of 80 acres for
parkland, recreation areas and school sites.
In reliance upon these actions, Quality purchased the property for
a price of $50 million, and obtained County approval of a Concept
Plan for the PUD. Thereafter, Quality incurred over $3 million in
development costs for Phase 1 of five planned phases including lot
layouts, construction of roads, utility lines and related infrastructure,
and dedication of 12 acres for recreational uses and park areas. All of
this work was conducted pursuant to approved site and subdivision
plans for Phase 1, which consisted of 200 detached single-family
homes and 60 apartment units. In addition to development activity on
Phase 1, grading, base course road construction, and dedication of 50
additional acres for park/recreation space was completed for Phases
2, 3 and 4 of the PUD in accordance with the approved Concept Plan.
(Phase 5, the commercial component, was to be built last.)
Stormwater management plans and permits for road construction for
the first four phases had also been approved.
The newly enacted RZO reduced residential densities in all
planned unit developments in the County by 60%, leaving Quality
with a density of two dwelling units per acre. As of the date of
enactment of the RZO, Quality had obtained 100 building permits for
Phase 1 and had started or completed construction of 70 dwellings. It
had received no building permits for any other phase of its PUD.
THE DOCTRINES OF VESTED RIGHTS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Much has been written on the law of vested rights and equitable
estoppel, and it is not the purpose of this article to delve deeply into
the evolution of these doctrines.5 Generally speaking, courts have
5. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 1, at §§ 6.12-6.23; G.P. Hanes & J.R. Minchew,
Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373 (1989); Benjamin
A. Kudo, Nukolii: Private Development Rights and the Public Interest, 16 URB. LAW. 279
(1984); Wendy U. Larsen & Steven M. Elrod, An Update on Vested Rights, LAND USE LAW &
ZONING DIG., Aug. 1983, at 4 (1983); Greg Overstreet & Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for
the Best Test to Vest: Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 SEATTLE U. L.
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applied two basic standards in determining whether a right has been
acquired to complete a development conceived before the proposed
or actual change in regulations. One of these, the “vesting rule,”
reflects principles of common and constitutional law and focuses on
whether real property rights that cannot be taken away by
government regulation have been acquired. The second standard,
known as the “estoppel rule,” derives from equity and focuses on
whether it would be equitable to allow the government to repudiate
its prior conduct.6 Under either the vested rights or estoppel standard,
the landowner must demonstrate (1) the existence of a valid
government act, (2) substantial reliance on the governmental act, (3)
good faith and (4) that the acquired rights are substantial enough to
make it fundamentally unfair to eliminate them.7
Generally, the developer must identify a specific governmental act
that authorized the particular course of action or development activity
and seek to establish that he has achieved a vested right to continue
the development. At least 30 state courts have used the issuance of a
building permit as the principal benchmark for the required
governmental act, but virtually all of these courts also require that
other actions be taken in reliance upon the permit, such as construc-
tion or expenditure of funds to implement the permit. States requiring
building permit issuance, plus substantial construction and/or other
reliance, such as expenditures include: 8
REV. (Summer 2000); Charles L. Siemon & Wendy U. Larsen, with Douglas Porter, Vested
Rights: Balancing Public and Private Development Expectations, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE,
1982; Thomas G. Pelham, Adam U. Lindgren & Lisa D. Weil, “What Do You Mean I Can’t
Build?” A Comparative Analysis of When Property Rights Vest, 31 URB. LAW. 901 (Fall 1999);
John J. Delaney & William Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested
Rights in Land Development, 23 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 219 (1979).
6. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at § 6.13; Frank Schnidman, Stanley D. Abrams & John J.
Delaney, Land Use Practice and Forms, Handling the Land Use Case, Chapter 35, Clark
Boardman Callaghan (2d ed. 1997).
7. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at §§ 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14.
8. See John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Rights As Protected
Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 27 (1996); see also Cymbidium Development Corp. v. Smith, 519 N.Y.S. 2d 711
(1987); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 170 S.E. 2d 904 (N.C. 1969). (Purchase of land after
issuance of a building permit, followed by purchase of a equipment for a dry cleaning plant and
entering into a contract for construction, held to have vested the owner’s right to continue in the
face of restrictive ordinance amendment.) One other state, Georgia, recognizes vested rights
upon issuance of a building permit even where there is no construction; Delaney & Vaias,
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Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
One reason for reliance on the issuance of a building permit is the
fact that it presents an objective basis for everyone to understand that
the land is being devoted to the particular use,9 thereby allowing the
court to avoid protracted analysis of subjective criteria such as the
landowner’s “good faith” in relying upon the governmental actions
and whether the owner’s reliance was “substantial.” However, the
building permit test has limited usefulness in many instances. For
example, on the issue of substantial reliance, the existence of a single
building permit is nowhere near as significant in a large scale
multiple-building project as it might be in a development involving
only a single building.
Courts have used two tests in their “substantial reliance” inquiry,
the first being the “proportionate/ratio test,” which examines the
percentage of money spent or obligations occurred as compared to
the total cost of the completed project.10 A second test, known as the
“balancing test” evaluates the public interest against the right of the
property owner to make use of the land, as well as the land owner’s
expenses and obligations already incurred.11 While the proportionate/
ratio test and the balancing test offer greater opportunity for
Recognizing Vested Rights As Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and
Takings Claims, Id.
9. See Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 623 A.2d 1296, 1304
(Md. 1993).
10. See Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 222 N.Y.S. 2d 526 (1961); 8 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations § 25.157 3d ed. rev. (1991).
11. See American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 311 N.E. 2d 325
(Ill. 1974); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 161 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1960).
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achieving an equitable result than the building permit test, they are
totally subjective in character and thus less reliable as precedent.12
“THE GREAT TERRAIN ROBBERY”
ACT TWO
Lucky Wins
Returning to our intrepid developers, we find that the State of
Euphoria follows the majority “late vesting rule”, i.e. that one must
have received a building permit and commenced construction (or
taken other actions in reliance on the building permit) in order to
acquire vested rights. Thus, Lucky’s two duplex units are allowed to
proceed. Lucky throws a party.
Plodder Loses
However, Plodder is not so “lucky.” Despite having spent
$200,000 in reliance upon subdivision and record plat approvals,
issuance of permits for stormwater management and grading of the
five lots, as well as permits for street construction and sewer and
water connections to the lots, Plodder is told by Suburban County
that he cannot proceed further because duplexes are no longer
permitted in single-family residential zones.
“But wait,” says Plodder, “my competitor, Lorraine Lucky, was
allowed to proceed even though she spent only $7,000 to obtain her
building permit, whereas I have spent over 25 times as much in
reliance upon the County’s approvals.”
“Alas,” says the County, “that is not the test, Mr. Plodder. The test
is whether you have received building permits for the duplexes and
started construction, which you have not.”
Plodder doesn’t understand. After all, aren’t sewer and water
connections, stormwater facilities and streets just as essential to the
viability and habitability of a dwelling as walls, floors, and a roof?
The County has long known from its approvals that he would be
12. See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 5.
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building duplexes, and that he was spending money in reliance on the
County’s actions. Besides, but for that mysterious two-month delay
in processing his sewer and water permit applications, Plodder would
have received his building permit before the RZO went into effect.
Back to the County he goes.
“Ah,” says the County, “we feel your pain, but Euphoria’s courts
allow us to draw the line at the building permit stage because we
have more complete information at that point as to what will be
constructed on your property. Thus, you should not have relied upon
our prior approvals to exempt you from zoning laws that may be in
effect when your building permit application is reviewed.”13
“But,” says Plodder (not knowing when to shut up), “didn’t you
know more than two years ago— and certainly five months ago when
you approved my sewer and water connection permits— that there
were likely to be ten duplex dwellings on these five lots? Based on
your approvals, I have put infrastructure in place for ten units, half of
which I now cannot use.”
“Sorry, Mr. Plodder. The law doesn’t support your case. Have a
good day.”14
Lucky’s Luck Turns
Thus, Plodder is left with no option but to sue the County (with
little likelihood of success) or to accept a 50 percent reduction in unit
yield as well as monetary losses attributable to his having provided
too much infrastructure for the project. He is deliberating this
Hobson’s Choice when lo-and-behold, there is more news about
Lucky, who by now has passed the foundation stage in constructing
her duplex. Suburban County’s watchdog civic group, “People
United to Respect the Environment (“PURE”) has discovered that
Lucky’s lot lies within 500 feet of a “sensitive stream,” i.e., a stream
13. Avco, 553 P.2d 546; see also Oceanic California, Inc. v. N. Cent, Coastal Region
Commission, 134 Cal. Rptr. 664 (Cal. 1976); Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Conservation
Comm., 139 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. App. 1977, aff’d.) 140 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Cal. 1977).
14. Plodder might have gotten a different response if he were in Vermont. See Preseault v.
Wheel, 315 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1974) (construction of a retaining wall to support 38 dwelling units
was sufficient to vest developer’s right to complete construction, even though only four units
had been constructed at the time of the zoning change.).
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known to harbor species of spawning fish, including endangered
species. Under a recently enacted County ordinance pertaining to
Sensitive Stream Protection Areas (SSPAs), namely, properties
located within 500 feet of designated sensitive streams must be
reviewed and approved by the County’s Sensitive Stream Protection
Area Unit prior to development, in order to ensure that no additional
sedimentation or other pollutants will affect the stream in question.
Lucky’s engineers were unaware of the lot’s location in an SSPA and
thus did not submit the building permit application for such review.
PURE demands that the County suspend or revoke Lucky’s building
permit, and the County promptly complies.
Lucky is stunned. She and her civil engineering firm have acted in
complete good faith and no one in the County or elsewhere ever told
them of the SSPA requirement or that Lucky’s building permit was
subject to such further review.
“Tsk, Tsk.” says the County, as it hands Lucky a Stop Work
Order. “In Euphoria, you don’t vest in an invalidly issued building
permit, whether or not you have acted in strict good faith. Our state
courts have so held.”15
Suddenly, Lucky is faced with at least a two-month delay, while
the SSPA Unit reviews her building permit, and thereafter, the
likelihood of long administrative and judicial appeal processes. If the
permit is reissued, PURE will almost certainly appeal to the County’s
Board of Appeal and thereafter to state courts— at least a two-year
process. If the permit is denied, Lucky faces the same prospect,
unless she abandons her construction effort. Maybe Plodder has some
thoughts.
A Second Chance for Plodder?
Lucky has lunch with Plodder and describes her fate. Plodder, of
course, knows very well how she feels.
“Lorraine,” he says, “I have good news and bad news. The bad
news is that I can’t help you. But the good news is that only last week
I learned that the mysterious two-month delay in processing my
15. See, e.g., 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.153 (3d ed. 1991); Zoning
Hearing Board v. Petrosky, 365 A.2d. 184 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
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sewer and water permits was purposefully carried out by the County
review section because it had received word from an ‘unidentified
high ranking County official’ that a zoning ordinance amendment
deleting duplexes as a permitted use in all single-family residential
zones was about to be filed by the County and that it would be
helpful if pending sewer and water permit applications for duplex
units “did not see the light of day for the next two months.”
Plodder wonders aloud: “Lorraine, if an unlawfully issued
building permit like yours does not confer vested rights, would not
the opposite be true in my case? If the failure to approve my building
permits and the consequent denial of vested status were due solely to
the County’s unlawful delay in processing my sewer and water
permits, shouldn’t I be entitled to relief?”
Lorraine had left.
Plodder’s lawyer isn’t sure.
“Maryland courts certainly don’t think that way, Paul. They have
consistently denied vested status in such circumstances, even when
the sole reason for the landowner’s inability to timely obtain a
building permit or commence construction is due to prior adjudicated
illegal actions of government agencies.16 In another case, a Maryland
county actually acknowledged that its own inadvertence or
misconduct was the cause of a year-long delay in processing the
approval of a subdivision application filed more than two years
previously, before an intervening comprehensive downzoning
reduced the density on the applicant’s property nearly in half. The
county proceeded to approve the subdivision under the original
density (i.e., the density in effect at the time of filing), but its good
intentions were trumped by its own People’s Zoning Counsel who
shamelessly argued to the court that the harried applicant had no
vested rights because it had not yet obtained building permits or
commenced construction.17 The court agreed with the People’s
16. See District Land Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 292 A.2d 695
(Md. 1972) (“District Land No. 1); County Council for Montgomery County v. District Land
Corp., 337 A.2d 712 (Md. 1975) (District Land No. 2”); Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. v. Board
of Appeals of the City of Gaithersburg, 262 A.2d. 499 (Md. 1970) (“Rockville Fuel & Feed No.
1”); Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672 (Md. 1972) (“Rockville
Fuel & Feed No. 2”); Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 418 A.2d. 1155 (Md. 1980).
17. See Sycamore Realty Co., Inc. v. People’s Counsel of Baltimore County et al., 684
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Counsel.”
“That’s outrageous,” says Plodder. “How come the county wasn’t
estopped by its own wrongdoing?”
“The applicant actually tried to invoke zoning estoppel,” answers
the lawyer, “but the court said that it was loath to impose estoppel
against the government when it is acting in a governmental
capacity.”18
“I can’t believe it,” says Plodder.
“As I recall,” says the lawyer, “even the Supreme Court doesn’t
seem sympathetic to vesting claims.19 But some states make an
exception from the strict late vesting rule where there is evidence of
bad faith on the part of the government.20 Perhaps Euphoria’s courts
will follow those precedents instead of Maryland’s. We’ll have to
wait and see. In any event, it is likely to be a long, difficult road.”
Quality and the Avco Virus— But What About the “Whole Parcel”
Theory?
The door to the office of Alan Alpha, Quality’s CEO, had been
closed for a long time.
“What do you mean,” roars the CEO to Sylvia Sharp, Quality’s
Senior Counsel? How can the County retroactively cut our density in
half when it has repeatedly approved our development plans for
several years and accepted our dedications of land for roads and open
spaces? We’ve lost 1,500 units with the stroke of a pen! How can that
be legal?”
“Well, Al, the State of Euphoria follows the California rule as set
A.2d. 1331 (Md. 1996).
18. Id. at 1335.
19. See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (The Court ignores lower court’s finding of vested rights for an
applicant whose density entitlement in a planned unit development had been abrogated by a
change in law and who had successfully pursued administrative appeals to the County Board of
Appeals as suggested by the County Planning Commission, only to have the Planning
Commission ignore the Board’s decision in favor of the landowner and against the Planning
Commission and maintain the new density restrictions.)
20. See, e.g., Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 451 N.W.2d 702 (Neb. 1990);
Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. 1994); Hock Investment Co., Inc.
v. City of San Francisco, 263 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. App. 1989); PMC Realty Trust v. Town of
Derry, 480 A.2d 51 (N.H. 1984).
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forth a quarter century ago in the Avco case. 21 Avco involved a very
large planned unit development of over 5,000 acres that had been
approved and partially developed several years before a change in
law required non-grandfathered developments in the Coastal Zone to
obtain building permits from the Coastal Commission. The effect was
to cut off Avco’s development rights even though it had spent well
over $2 million in planning and site improvements and had conveyed
parkland to the County at a below-market price.”
“Sounds like our situation, says the CEO. How could they have
lost?”
“It was like us, perhaps even worse,” says Sharp. “The case
focused on a 74-acre parcel of the PUD where a subdivision for
apartments had been approved, grading permits issued and
construction had been underway on streets, utilities and the like
before the permit requirement was imposed.”
“That sounds exactly like us,” says Alpha. “How could the court
rule against them after the County issued all of those permits?”
“Well, Al, it came down to building permits, and Avco had not
received any. The California Supreme Court said that Avco’s claims
of ‘substantial reliance’ were unavailing because they related only to
preliminary approvals rather than to building permits for identifiable
structures. Thus, the Court ruled that Avco had no vested right to
continue with its PUD.”
“But we and our lender have relied on the County’s approvals.”
says the CEO. “Aren’t they important? All of that engineering work
which we have done on Phases 1 through 4 was specifically designed
to support 2,500 dwellings. The County has known for years what
was to be built here. It’s outrageous and unfair what they have done.”
“Fairness has nothing to do with it, Al. In fact, the lower court in
Avco actually stated that if fairness was the issue, Avco would have
been allowed to complete its development.22 It was all about the lack
of ‘a building permit’.” 23
“Sylvia,” thunders the CEO, “we’re not going to take this lying
down. I can’t believe that a court in the 21st Century would allow all
21. Avco, supra note 4, at 546.
22. Id. at 549.
23. Id.
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of the development approvals we have relied upon to be lost for the
lack of a building permit. Take another look at that Avco case and see
what authority the court cites to support its ruling.”
Sharp re-examines the Avco decision, and finds that the two
principal cases relied upon by the court in denying vested rights to
the PUD developer involved respectively the failure to obtain “a
building permit” for a “service station,” and “a building permit” for a
“high-rise apartment complex,” each on “a single tract of land.”24
Neither case remotely resembled the factual situation involving a
long-term buildout pursuant to multiple approvals as in Avco or
Quality’s PUD. Yet, the Avco court held that “despite minor factual
variations” its two cited cases were “clearly controlling.”25
Moreover, Sharp wonders whether the Avco court’s repeated
references to the need for construction pursuant to “a building
permit,” leave open the question whether, in the court’s view, a
building permit for a single building— such as a house— would have
sufficed to vest the PUD developer’s rights. If it does, thinks Sharp,
the absurdity of the late vesting rule in PUD cases is amplified since
the issuance of a building permit for a single building out of hundreds
of buildings yet to be built does virtually nothing to alter the basic
equation, i.e., the developer’s significant change of position based
upon substantial reliance on repeated prior approvals. On the other
hand, if a lone building permit would not suffice to vest the entire
project, and if permits for each and every building in the PUD are
required in order to vest, the Avco court, despite its protestations to
the contrary, would seem to be giving “obdurate adherence to archaic
concepts inappropriate in the context of modern development
practices.” 26
Further, Sharp finds that courts in other states, including some
which follow the traditional late vesting rule (building permit plus
construction), recognize that the developer’s right to complete a
large-scale PUD should vest earlier in the process, such as when the
24. Anderson v. City Council, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning,
53 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1966) (discussed in Avco at 553 P.2d at 550-552).
25. 553 P.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 554.
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initial approval is implemented. 27
Sharp reports her findings to Alpha.
“It all comes down to whether Euphoria’s courts will continue to
apply the Avco rule, or take into account the factors considered in
other state courts, such as the significant difference in the ‘substantial
reliance’ factor when relying upon repeated land use approvals in
large scale buildouts, as compared to simply having to obtain a
building permit for a discrete building on single parcel of land.”
“Well,” says the CEO, “I don’t have much hope that that will
happen. But I do have one other question. Do you remember that
takings case that I was so upset about a short while back where the
court reversed a $4 million takings award to the landowner?”
“I remember it,” says Sylvia. “It was a Michigan case.”28 “The
landowner owned four contiguous parcels comprising over 80 acres,
which were in various stages of development. On one of the parcels a
wetlands permit was denied, precluding development of that parcel,
and the owner won a $4 million judgment in the lower court, which
was reversed. But what’s your point, Al?”
“Well,” says Al, growing more excited, “I remember the court
talking about the ‘whole parcel’ theory being applicable where the
four parcels were being developed together and treated as a single
unit by the owner. The court went on to say that it was wrong to look
only at the single parcel when deciding whether a taking had
occurred, and that the principle of non-segmentation should be
27. See, e.g., Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, 650 P.2d 963 (Or. App. 1982)
(developer of 440-acre planned unit development vested its right to complete the development
based upon approval of the original PUD plan, notwithstanding the fact that the developer later
sought and obtained approval of a revised PUD plan.); In re Diamond’s Appeal, 196 A.2d 363
(Pa. 1964) (stating that the time to challenge the validity of an integrated mixed-use plan is at
the time of issuance of the initial permits implementing the plan. A court challenge to the
commercial portion of the development, filed more than two years after the rezoning was
approved and construction of residential areas was commenced, was not allowed. For the
purpose of vesting, development will be considered as a single entity if it is so planned and
presented.) (Pennsylvania is a late vesting state.) See also Rockshire Civic Assn., Inc. v. Mayor
and Council of Rockville, 358 A.2d 570 (Md. 1976) (While deciding the issue of vesting in a
PUD case on statutory grounds, the court acknowledged that in applying vesting principles to
the PUD “we are not dealing with the conventional zoning”) (Maryland is a late vesting state.)
28. K&K Construction, Inc. v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 575 N.W. 2d 531 (Mich.
1998).
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applied to determine the ‘denominator parcel’ in such cases.29 In
other words, all four parcels had to be considered together in
determining whether there was a taking.”
“Yes, Al, but that was a takings case. How does it apply here?”
“Common sense!” exclaims Alpha. “If contiguous parcels, such as
the five that we have been developing in Flower Valley under a
County-approved unified development plan, comprise the ‘whole
parcel” for takings purposes, why shouldn’t the same principle of
non-segmentation also apply to support our vested rights claim in this
case?”
“Good thought, Al. I’ll look into it.”
“Please do,” says the CEO, “I really want to sue those [persons].”
THE NEED FOR REFORM
The law of vested rights has become a minefield which needs to
be cleared. The issues are not new, and many commentators have
discussed them.30 In today’s world, the land use regulatory review
process has become increasingly elongated and complex, with
environmental permitting often overlaying the traditional review
process, regulations proliferating, more reviewing agencies in the mix
and more public hearings. These factors and the increasing uncer-
tainty that accompanies them, have led to a serious problem. In many
areas, there is already a crisis of confidence, which will surely deepen
if nothing is done to promote more predictability in the system.
When coupled with the inability of many state courts to establish a
coherent and consistent body of case law on vested rights, the
problem becomes particularly acute for large-scale multi-building
developments with long-term buildouts. High quality,
environmentally sensitive developments cannot be planned, built or
financed in a “gotcha” atmosphere where repeated governmental
approvals may not be worth the paper they are written on. The
demise of such projects, while possibly perceived as a good thing by
some, will ultimately have adverse impacts on the well-being and
economic vitality of communities all over the country.
29. Id. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 n.7 (1992).
30. See supra note 5.
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Smart growth and other worthy growth management goals will
never be achieved unless there is also “smart process.” One of the
keys to achieving smart process is to reform the chaotic state of the
law on vested rights. As once observed by two respected
commentators, “unfortunately, there are no rules for changing the
rules.”31 This problem is gradually being cured, as can be seen from
the statutory reforms that have been adopted in several states.
Statutory remedies and enlightened court decisions can do much to
stabilize the situation.
STATUTORY REFORM
Two statutory reforms, namely, state-wide vesting laws and
development agreements legislation, are often mentioned as a means
of promoting uniformity in this area.32
Vesting Laws
A number of states have enacted vesting laws, including: 33
Arizona New Jersey
California North Carolina
Colorado Pennsylvania
31. SIEMON & LARSON, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 5.
32. See, e.g., D.R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 6.22 (4th ed. 1997); Gregory
Overstreet & Diana Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest: Washington’s Vested
Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest,, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (Summer 2000); C.L. Siemon et al.,
Vested Rights: Balancing Public and Private Development Expectations, 1982 URB. LAND
INSTITUTE  1982; DELANEY & KOMINERS, supra note 5.
33. See MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 6.22; THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION’S
OCTOBER 27, 1999, DRAFT GROWING SMARTSM LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK (final ed., Oct. 27,
1999). Citations, as set forth in the Guidebook are: Ariz. Rev. Stat § 9-1201(3)(4) ff. (1997);
Cal. Govt. Code § 66498(1)(a) ff. (1997); Col. Rev. Stat. § 24068-102(4) ff. (1997); Fla. Stat
§ 163.3167(8) ff. (1997); Kan. Stat. § 12-764(a) ff. (1997); Mass. Gen’l. Law, Ch. 40A § 6 ff.
(1997); N.J. Stat. § 40:55D-49(a) ff. (1997); N.C. Gen’l. Stat. § 160A-385.1(b)(5) ff. (1997);
Pa. Stat. tit. 53, § 1050808(4)(i) ff. (1997); 1998 Va. Acts, Ch. 801. Washington’s vesting
statutes are found in Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.27.095 and § 58.17.033. See OVERSTREET &
KIRCHHEIM, supra note 5, § V. Texas’ vesting law was inadvertently allowed to lapse in 1997.
However, it was re-enacted in 1999. See Texas Local Gov’t. Code § 245 (1999). The original
legislation is found at Texas Gov’t. Code § 481.143(a) (1996).
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Florida Texas
Kansas Virginia
Massachusetts Washington
A majority of vesting statutes recognize one’s right to proceed
with development under the law in effect at the time of approval of a
site-specific application, such as a preliminary subdivision plan.
Colorado, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are among the states having
such statutes. Other vesting statutes, such as Washington’s and the re-
instated Texas law, allow property owners to have their proposed
developments proceed under regulations in effect at the time a com-
plete development permit application is filed, regardless of any
subsequent changes in land use laws. Washington’s law is especially
interesting. It has been described as a superior document, worthy of
emulation in other states, because “its strong protections benefit both
citizens and government by creating certainty and enforcing
fairness.”34
Development Agreements Legislation
Several states have enacted legislation authorizing their political
subdivisions to enter into development agreements with applicants
for land use approvals. These include:35
Arizona Maryland
California Minnesota
Florida Nevada
Hawaii New Jersey
Local governments and developers who rely on implied— as
opposed to express— statutory authority to support conditions or
exactions negotiated through development agreements do so at their
34. See OVERSTREET & KIRCHHEIM, supra note 5, § 245.
35. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.05 (1990); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65864-65869.5
(West 1983 & Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 163.3220-163.3243 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995);
Haw. Rev. Stat. VV46-121 to 46-132 (1985); Md. Code Ann. Art. 28, V7-121 (1995) and Md.
Code Ann. Art. 66B, § 13.01 (1995); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 462.358 (West 1991); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 278.0201 (1991); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40.:55D-45.2 (West 1991).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p603+Delaney.doc 01/04/01
620 Festschrift [Vol. 3:603
peril.36 The susceptibility of such ad hoc arrangements to collateral
attack by other parties to review process is great. Thus, the applicant
and local government share an obvious mutual interest in having
express authority to act, with uniform standards and procedures, such
as provided in development agreements legislation.
The development agreement is essentially a contract between the
local government and the landowner/developer, executed as part of
the development approval process. One of its major features is a
provision for a “freeze period” during which subsequent changes to
the law or regulations will not effect the applicant’s right to complete
the proposed use at its approved density or intensity. The
development agreement is particularly valuable when dealing with
multi-building, multi-phased or long-term developments.37
Historically, courts have been reluctant to approve ad hoc agreements
between local governments and applicants for land use approvals,
believing this to be an inappropriate “bargaining away” of police
power and against public policy.38 As noted, development agreements
legislation attempts to address this issue by providing uniform
specific standards and a public process under which an agreement
may be negotiated. These include the requirement for a public
hearing, specification of the duration of the agreement, and required
findings that the proposed development is consistent with the
comprehensive plan and development regulations of the
jurisdiction.39
Further, the enabling legislation and the development agreement
itself should provide that subsequently enacted laws can be applied to
affect the approved use, density or intensity of the project if essential
36. See, e.g., Nunziato v. Planning Board, 541 A.2d 1105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988); Township of Marlboro v. Planning Bd. of Holmdel, 653 A.2d 1183 (N.J. 1995);
Altman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor Annapolis, 522 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989).
37. See DAVID L. CALLIES, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS, ch. 9A (Kelly Ed. 1997); Daniel L. Curtin, Protecting Developers’ Permits To
Build: Development Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 18 ZONING AND
PLANNING L. REP. 11 (1995). Theodore C. Taub, Development Agreements, 1991 ALI-ABA
LAND USE INST. 555.
38. See, e.g., Attman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989);
J.J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road From Prohibition to “Let’s Make a Deal!”,
25 URB. LAW. 49, 56 (Winter 1993).
39. See supra note 37. See also J.J. Delaney, Development Agreements Legislation: The
Maryland Experience, 2 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 807.
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to ensure preservation of the public health and safety. This exception
recognizes the right and duty of government to exercise its police
power to address exigent situations, while upholding the integrity of
the development agreement in all other respects.
As noted, the most significant benefit for the landowner/developer
is the provision of a “freeze period” during which the approved
development rights (use, density or intensity) cannot be affected by
changes in law enacted subsequent to project approval. The length of
the freeze period should be negotiable, depending upon the
complexity of the project, economic conditions and other relevant
factors.
There are also significant benefits for the local government. For
example, in times of inadequate public funding for infrastructure,
local governments must increasingly rely on private funding
mechanisms, such as, the development agreement, to ensure the
timely provision of public facilities. Agreements may also provide for
protection of sensitive areas, dedications for public amenities and
phasing of development. Voluntarily executed agreements also
reduce the risk of litigation when permit exactions are simply
imposed via exercise of the police power and issues of
proportionality are raised.40
COMMON LAW REFORM
In states that do not have vested rights statutes or development
agreements legislation, particularly states adhering to the late vesting
(building permit plus construction) rule, a more enlightened approach
by the courts, attuned to the realities of the land-use approval process,
would do much to reform the common law of vested rights. This is
especially true when the courts are dealing with large scale, multi-
building projects with long-term buildouts. In such cases, the courts
should conduct the following analysis:
· Consider all relevant construction. The late vesting rule is
unworkable in long term buildout cases. Of what relevance is
“construction” of a building pursuant to a building permit when, in
40. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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reliance upon repeated land use approvals, enormous expenditures
have been made or obligated by the developer in planning,
engineering and construction of equally necessary project
components, such as lots, roads, infrastructure and public amenities,
without which a viable building would not be possible in the first
place?
· Re-examine “substantial reliance.” Commencement of
construction of a single building on a single parcel of land pursuant to
a single building permit, when there may be dozens or hundreds of
buildings to be built in a phased development, generally adds little to
the equation of “substantial reliance” in large scale, segmented
development cases. The developer’s position has already changed as
a result of major land development work required by prior approvals.
· Scrutinize justifications offered for departing from prior
approvals. Through a series of land use approvals, such as approval
of concept plans, subdivision plans, site plans, stormwater
management plans, acceptance of dedications for roads and public
amenities, and issuance of permits for grading, street and utility
construction, the government gains an ever increasing knowledge of
the specifics of the project (e.g., the planned use, density and
intensity),41 and with each such exercise of the police power, findings
are made that approval of the proposed project will promote the
public health, safety and welfare. Therefore, it is blatantly arbitrary
and incredible for the government to later argue that its prior
approvals should not have been relied upon and that it can repudiate
them with impunity at the building permit stage. Such arguments
should be rejected except in the very rare instance where a direct and
imminent threat to public health or safety is posed by the
development, such as when contamination of the public water supply
would result. In the alternative, and at the very least, the government
should be required to justify its contrary action under a higher
standard of judicial review, namely that its change of position is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.42
41. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Comm’n, 553
P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976); In Re Diamonds Appeal, 196 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1964); County Council for
Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 337 A.2d 712 (Md. 1975).
42. See Charles L. Siemon et al., Vested Rights: Balancing Public and Private
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· Apply “parcel as a whole” analysis. In situations where a
planned segmented development of contiguous parcels under
common ownership has been approved and is being developed as a
single unit under a coordinated plan of development, the principle of
“non-segmentation” should be applied to protect the owner’s
property rights, and a claim of vested status based on partial
development of the “parcel as a whole” should be upheld.43 If a
takings case should be evaluated under the parcel as a whole theory, a
vested rights claim should receive similar analysis and not be rejected
simply because buildings have not yet been constructed in all phases
of the project.44
· Do not reward improper government conduct. Just as a
landowner cannot normally claim a vested right, based upon a build-
ing permit issued as a result of mistake of fact or in violation of law,
neither should a landowner who is unable to timely obtain a building
permit or commence instruction because of improper or unlawful
government action be denied vested status.45
EPILOGUE
Loraine Lucky, fed up with the uncertainties and stress of the land
development business, sold her property and enlisted in the Navy
Seals. She later married the Suburban County official who had
delayed issuance of Paul Plodder’s water and sewer permits.
“I always liked the guy”, she said. “He has good instincts.”
Paul Plodder sued Suburban County and won, but before he could
obtain building permits for his 10 duplex units, successive
development moratoria in Pristine Acres based on inadequate roads
and sewers, followed by a restrictive school allocation program, put
his property on hold for several years. A series of reapplications—
Development Expectations,  1982 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE.
43. See K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 575 N.W. 2d 531 (Mich. 1998);
Forest Properties v. United States, 177 F. 3d 1360 (1999).
44. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (“In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . .
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole.” (emphasis added)).
45. See, e.g., Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672 (Md.
1972); Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 418 A.2d 1155 (Md. 1980).
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each successively for a reduced number of dwellings— were rejected.
Finally, when the County denied an application for a single estate
home on what used to be his five lots, Plodder retained nationally
pre-eminent takings attorneys Martin Bergman, and Gilbert Kanfer,
to file suit.
“The only thing worse than retroactivity is no activity,” he said.
Euphoria’s courts rejected Plodder’s suit, but his certiorari petition
was granted by the United States Supreme court.
The Board of Directors of Quality Development Company,
overruling its CEO, Alan Alpha, decided not to go to court. The
remainder of Quality’s property was sold at a huge loss to the County
for parkland. Alpha resigned from Quality and dropped out of sight.
Sometime later, he showed up at a Therevada Buddhist monastery in
Sri Lanka where every day he pursues the Four Noble Truths,
especially the one dealing with the universality of suffering. In a
farewell letter to Sylvia Sharp, he wrote:
“There is a fine balance here between the natural and the spiri-
tual. There never was any balance in the State of Euphoria or in
Suburban County. They should have listened to that Mandelker fella.
He knew what he was talking about.”
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To assist the reader, some leading vested rights cases are
examined in the context of the development chronology, beginning
with acquisition of land and ending with commencement of
construction pursuant to a validly issued building permit.
Vested
Rights?
A. ACQUISITION OF LAND WITHOUT USE
(CONTEMPLATED USE)
Generally, the property owner has no vested right in the
existing zoning of the property.
No Houston v. Bd. of City Comm’rs of City of Wichita, 543
P.2d 1010, 1019 (Kan. 1975). The mere planning of
anticipated uses does not vest rights as against a change in
zoning.
No Nyczepir v. Town of Naples, 586 A.2d 1254 (Me. 1991)
No Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler, 244 S.E.2d 542
(Va. 1978)
Yes Minch v. City of Fargo, 297 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1980);
aff’d 332 N.W. 2d 71 (N.D. 1983).
Yes Zoning Commission of New Canaan v. New Canaan
Building Co., 148 A.2d 330, 333 (Conn. 1959).
Reclassification of land zoned for apartments for 15 years
to single-family residential did not defeat the vested right
of the property owner inasmuch as the rezoning was not in
pursuance of a comprehensive plan.
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Vested
Rights?
B.  PRELIMINARY ACTIVITY:
PLANNING/ARCHITECTURAL DRAWINGS
Generally no vested rights arise from preparation of pre-
liminary plans.
No Gosselin v. City of Nashua, 321 A.2d 593, 596-97 (N.H.
1974). $100,000 spent on planning, architectural and
engineering services to prepare to build a shopping center
prior to ordinance amendment deleting shopping centers
held not to vest developer’s right to continue. There was
no government act upon which developer could have
placed reliance.
No Cohn Communities, Inc. v. Clayton County, 359 S.E.2d
887 (Ga. 1987). Letter from County Planner, which stated
present zoning of multi-family zoned tract, was not the
kind of assurance required to create vested rights in
landowner.
No See also Whitfield v. Seabrook, 190 S.E.2d 743 (S.C.
1972).
Yes Fifteen Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 155 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ill. 1958). $105,000
architectural contract for an apartment building gave rise
to vested rights as against change in zoning.
C.  PRELIMINARY ACTIVITY: TESTING OF THE
LAND
The general rule is that test borings and engineering
studies do not give rise to vested rights.
No Smith v. Juillerat, 119 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1954).
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Vested
Rights?
D. FILING OF SUBDIVISION PLAT/SITE
PLAN/SPECIAL USE PERMIT
General rule: The filing of a subdivision plat or site plan
does not establish a use in which one’s rights may vest.
No Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 504 S.E. 2d 618 (Va. 1998).
Developer’s untimely filing of subdivision/record plat
applications pursuant to a grandfather clause allowing
applications to be reviewed under junior zoning and
subdivision ordinances did not give rise to a vested right.
No Walsh v. Town of Orono, 585 A.2d 829, 831-32 (Me.
1991). Filing of site and subdivision applications prior to
ordinance amendment which rezoned applicant’s property
to exclude multi-family development did not vest
applicant’s right to proceed under prior zoning because
there had been no “substantive review” of the applications
by the Planning Board as of the date of the ordinance
amendment. Thus, the applications were not “pending.”
No Bibeau v. Village Clerk of the Village of Tuxedo Park,
535 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1988). Application for final plat
approval did not give subdividers a vested right to have
the law in effect at the time of their initial application
control the final plat approval.
No See also Matter of Property Developer, Inc. v. Swiatek,
593 N.Y.S. 2d 702 (1993); Brazos Land, Inc. v. Board of
County Comm’rs of Rio Arriba County, 848 P.2d 1095
(N.M. App. 1993); Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 919 (Cal. App. 1974); Sherman-Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Goldsmith, 230 A.2d 568 (Conn. 1967).
Yes Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 943 P.2d 1378 (Wash.
1997). Developer purchased an acre of land with the intent
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/24
p603+Delaney.doc 01/04/01
2000] Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology 629
Vested
Rights?
of building duplexes. At that time the County zoning code
allowed duplexes on lots with a minimum size of 13,500
feet. On August 2, 1990 the developer filed an application
for a short plat to divide the acre into three lots in order to
build a duplex on each. On August 15, 1990 the developer
applied for building permits but was denied for two of the
three duplexes because the short plat had not yet been
approved. In October 1990, while the short plat
application was still pending, the County adopted an
ordinance changing the minimum lot size requirement for
a duplex from 13,500 to 20,000 square feet. In July 1991,
the County approved the short plat for the three lots.
Several months later the County issued all three duplex
building permits. However, in January 1992, after sub-
stantial construction, the County “red tagged” two of the
duplexes and stopped construction. The developer
appealed and the County reversed the stop work order.
Construction was completed and then the developer sued
the County for delay damages.
     The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed State case
and statutory law on vested rights and determined that the
a developer is entitled to have its land development
proposal processed under the regulations in effect at the
time it filed a complete building permit application.
Washington courts had previously not extended the vested
rights doctrine to applications for preliminary plat
approval or short plat approval. However, in 1987, the
legislature enacted a vested rights statute, codifying the
State’s vested rights doctrine that allowed vesting upon
application for building permits, and expanding it to
include short subdivision and short plat applications as
well.
Yes Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056, 1060
(Wash. 1994). Developer’s rights vested at the time of
application for preliminary plat approval, and County
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Vested
Rights?
Council acted properly in approving the application
notwithstanding the absence of building setback lines as
required by plat application ordinance. State statute
extended vested rights to “fully complete” preliminary
plat applications. However, local ordinance requirements
for a fully completed application at the time of filing the
subject application were highly ambiguous, and were
clarified only after the application was filed and deemed
complete under then-existing regulations. Vesting proce-
dures which are vague and discretionary cannot be used to
deny an applicant vested rights.
E. PRELIMINARY APPROVALS: APPROVAL OF
SUBDIVISION PLAN
General Rule: No rights vest, since no use established.
No L.M. Everhart Construction, Inc. v. Jefferson County
Planning Comm’n, 2 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1993);
No Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d
1227 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1993)
F. PRELIMINARY APPROVALS: APPROVAL OF
RECORD PLAT
General rule: No vested right, since no use established,
but a substantial number of cases are contra.
No Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Porter, 563 A.2d 779,
782 (Me. 1989). Landowner acquired no vested rights to
construct and operate a solid waste disposal site even
though its development plan was submitted and reviewed
by the planning board prior to the revision of a zoning
ordinance, and statute provided that any application
“pending” at the time of an ordinance revision was
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Vested
Rights?
entitled to review under the ordinance in effect at the time
it was submitted. The plan was found not to be pending
because neither simple presentment to the planning board
nor initial review by the board to determine whether the
application was complete constituted “substantial review.”
No Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 901 (Utah
1988). Property owner had no vested right to build under
zoning classification in effect at time of his application for
conceptual approval, since his application did not comply
with zoning ordinance requirements then in effect as
zoning change was pending prior to application and owner
and his architect were aware of pending change.
Yes Bleznak v. Township of Evesham, 406 A.2d 201, 219
(N.J. 1979). Owner’s vested right to continue development
of a nursery school for three years after site plan approval
was protected by statute.
G. PRELIMINARY APPROVALS: SPECIAL
EXCEPTION/ SPECIAL USE PERMIT
General rule: No vested right.
No Haher’s Sodus Point Bait Shop, Inc. v. Wigle, 528
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1988); appeal denied, 535 N.Y.S.2d
595 (1988). Property owner did not acquire any vested
rights in use of docks, which extended over water
belonging to state, and was not entitled to Special Permit
to continue certain use of docks, merely because owner’s
predecessors obtained necessary permits from Army
Corps of Engineers and the Department of Environmental
Conservation. These permits did not convey any property
interest and owner’s reliance on them as an entitlement to
an exemption from local regulation was misplaced.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p603+Delaney.doc 01/04/01
632 Festschrift [Vol. 3:603
Vested
Rights?
No Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291
A.2d 672, 675 (Md. 1972). See Paragraph L, infra.
Property owner obtained no vested right in special
exception for concrete batching plant, which was found by
the Court to have been unlawfully denied, in light of
ordinance amendment deleting such use after court ruling.
Yes Board of Spvsrs. of Fairfax County v. Medical Structures,
Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972). Approval of special
exception for nursing home, followed by approval of site
plan, coupled with diligence and good faith plus
substantial expenditures by property owner in pursuit of
development prior to change in zoning, vested owner’s
right to continue.
Yes Board of Spvsrs. of Fairfax County v. Cities Service Oil
Co., 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1972). Approval of special use
permit constituted government action upon which reliance
could be placed, even though building permit not issued.
H. CHANGES TO LAND BEFORE BUILDING
PERMIT(S) ISSUED
Generally no vested rights are recognized where changes
are made to the land (demolition of existing buildings,
grading, filling, etc.) prior to issuance of building permit.
1.  Filling Swampland
No Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. The Township
of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 239 (N.J. 1963).
Filling of swampland regarded as mere preparation of land
for a future use, not a present use.
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2.  Clearing/Grading
No Burroughs v. Town of Paradise Valley, 724 P.2d 1239,
1241-42 (Ariz. 1986). Landowner had no vested right to
build a Frank Lloyd Wright-designed house on her
property, although prior owner had leveled top of
mountain, utilities had been bought, and $18,000 had been
paid for plans, where no building permit was ever issued
nor was any application ever filed. Also, previous owner’s
expenditures to level mountain top to create home site was
irrelevant to determination of whether landowner had a
vested right to build house, where expenditures by prior
owner was with regard to construction he planned to
undertake long before Wright plans were created.
No Fairlawns Cemetery Assn. V. Zoning Comm’n of Town of
Bethel, 86 A.2d 74, 80 (Conn. 1952). Clearing of land for
cemetery gave rise to no vested right.
Yes Pingatore v. Town of Cave Creek, 981 P.2d 126 (Ariz.
App. 1998). Town was held to be estopped from halting
grading and related activity pursuant to a driveway permit
for a residence, based upon alleged violation of a recently
enacted zoning ordinance concerning “ridge lines.” A
building permit had not been obtained, but in approving
the driveway permit, the Town had concluded that the
proposed home satisfied the yard, lot, height and size re-
quirements of the then current zoning. By proceeding in
reliance upon this “zoning clearance” and spending thou-
sands of dollars in so doing, the landowner’s right to com-
plete the project was protected, and the Town was
estopped from intervening, despite the apparent violation
of the ridge line requirement.
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3.  Street/Infrastructure Dedications
Yes H.R.D.E., Inc. v. Zoning Officer of the City of Romney,
430 S.E.2d 341, 346 (W.Va. 1993). Property owner has
vested right to complete housing project for elderly and
physically handicapped, despite the fact that construction
had not begun prior to enactment of zoning ordinance,
where landowner’s acts went beyond “mere contemplated
use or preparation,” and mayor had assured owner by
letter that its project would be grandfathered under
proposed new ordinance. The court noted that the
landowner, acting in good faith, had deeded land for
streets to the City, given the City storm sewers and
culverts which it had installed, and had spent
approximately $95,000 on soil studies, engineering and
architectural fees to prepare for construction.
4.  Widening of Road
No Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526, 530
(Sup. Ct. 1961). $120,000 spent on road widening not
shown to be exclusively for the proposed project.
5.  Clearing/Road-Building/Lot Stakeouts
Yes Application of Campsites Unlimited, Inc., 215 S.E.2d 73,
79 (N.C. 1975). Clearing of land, coupled with some road-
building and staking out of lots, even with notice of a
pending change in the ordinance, did not freeze the devel-
oper’s right to proceed.
“The right of landowners to develop their properties in
ways then lawful cannot be frozen by a county’s or a
municipality’s announcement of its undertaking of a
general study of zoning which, at some future date, may or
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may not lead to the adoption of an ordinance restricting
the landowner’s proposed use of his land.” Id. at 79.
Note: The court’s opinion could have been influenced by
the fact that no further building activity was contemplated.
6.  Ancillary Activities
Yes Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190, 193-94 (Ore.
1973). Vested rights recognized where property was
purchased for development as a chicken processing plant;
owner planted cover crops, increased electrical capacity,
installed an irrigation system, and prepared a site plan.
The court employed a balancing test, taking into account
the good faith of the property owner and the nature of the
project in construing these rather nebulous activities as
vesting the owner’s right to continue.
I.  SITE DEVELOPMENT WORK WHERE NOT ALL
PERMITS ISSUED
Cases in this area turn upon whether the site development
work related to the entire project or merely to those units/
buildings for which building permits were issued.
No Town of Lima v. Harper, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755-56 (App.
Div. 1977); aff’d, 404 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1978). No vested
right recognized where only 45 of 300 building permits
for mobile home sites had been obtained. Although
developer had spent $16,400 for paving and related work,
these expenditures were held to be exclusively for the 45
sites for which permits had been issued.
Yes Ellington Construction Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals
of the Incorporated Village of New Hempstead, 549
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N.Y.S.2d 405, 413-14 (A.D.2 Dept. 1989); aff’d 564
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1990). Landowner acquired vested rights
to obtain building permits for the remainder of its lots in
accordance with the provisions of the former zoning
ordinance both through its irrevocable dedication of
parklands upon which the approval of the subdivision was
conditioned, and through its substantial expenditures made
on roads and utilities prior to, during, and after the ex-
piration of the exemption period. The subdivision was to
be built in two phases, and almost all of the building
permits had been issued for the first section, and seven
houses had been constructed pursuant to those permits. It
would have cost over $2,200,000 to conform the
improvements to the amended zoning ordinance, which
increased the area requirements for landowner’s property.
Yes Preseault v. Wheel, 315 A.2d 244, 247 (Vt. 1974).
Developer of 38-unit residential project was held to have
obtained a vested right to complete the entire
development, even though only 4 of 38 building permits
had been issued. The court’s holding was based upon the
developer’s construction of a retaining wall (on the shore
of Lake Champlain), which work was deemed to be
related to the entire project.
J. VESTED CONTRACTUAL INTEREST
This is a relatively untested issue in vested rights law.
However, with the increased tendency of the public sector
to rely upon public improvement agreements, developer
agreements and other contractual relationships with
private developers to acquire public infrastructure, it is
likely that additional case law on this subject will soon
emerge.
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Yes Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Crane, 352 A.2d
786 (Md. 1976). Where property owner had conveyed
approximately 5 acres of an 11-acre tract to the city for a
future road extension, pursuant to an ordinance which
allowed the property owner to develop the remainder of
his property at the same density that would have originally
applied to the entire 11-acre site, court found a “vested
contractual interest” to exist in favor of the property
owner some 7 years later when the city declined to
approve full development of the remaining 6 acres based
upon an intervening change in the law.
Yes Ward v. City of New Rochelle, 197 N.Y.S.2d 64, 69 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); aff’d 197 N.Y.S.2d 128 (N.Y. App.Div. 1959);
aff’d 204 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1960). Dedication/conveyance of
land to the city pursuant to a bilateral agreement held to
have established a vested contractual interest in favor of
the property owner.
Yes Leaf Co. v. Montgomery County, 520 A.2d 732 (Md.
App. 1987). A vested contractual interest need not be
based upon a formal written agreement, but may arise
through the actions of the parties and a well-established
course of dealing.
Yes Farmer v. Jamieson, 354 A.2d 225, 231 (Md. App. 1976).
The power of the local legislative body to amend master
plans did not empower it to “arbitrarily impair” a
previously incurred contractual obligation arising from a
public works agreement.
K. APPLICATION FOR BUILDING PERMIT
Generally an application for a building permit does not
vest one’s right to the proposed use in the face of a change
of law. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.155
(1991).
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No City of Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1996) After
the fact application for building permit for hot tub and
deck that landowner had constructed on property
designated as historic landmark did not give rise to a
vested right even assuming that the law in existence at
time of permit application— but subsequently amended—
could have allowed issuance of the permit.
No Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 451 N.W.2d 702
(Neb. 1990). Oil Company’s filing of a building permit
application to construct a gas station, convenience store
and car wash, 3 months before a civic association’s
rezoning application to reclassify the Company’s property
and 9 months before zoning ordinance was amended to
delete said use, did not give Company a vested right to
develop under the former ordinance. Company’s
expenditures on plans (approximately $5,000) and
professional fees (approximately $10,000) were deemed
not substantial enough to avoid retroactive effect of
ordinance amendment. Pg. 706 (On remand the trial court
found that the City Planning Commission’s delay in
processing Company’s application was arbitrary,
unreasonable and in bad faith. Its decision was affirmed
with minor modifications in Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. 1994). Damages were
awarded in a companion case, Whitehead Oil Co. v. City
of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401 (Neb. 1994).
No City of Portland v. Fisherman’s Wharf Associates II, 541
A.2d 160, 164 (Me. 1988) Builder did not have vested
rights to pursue project for which a building permit
application was filed with knowledge of a pending
ordinance that specifically stated it applied retroactively.
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No Fairmount Township Bd. of Supervisors by Fairmount
Township Zoning Bd. v. Beardmore, 431 N.W.2d 292,
295 (N.D. 1988). Ordinance requiring applicants to pay
cost of application did not take away or impair vesting
rights of applicant whose application was pending because
applicants did not have vested rights, but, rather, had mere
expectancy of obtaining permit.
No In Re McCormick Management Co., Inc., 547 A.2d 1319,
1322 (Vt. 1988). Filing subdivision development plan
prior to town’s adoption of zoning ordinance created no
vested right to develop lots in accordance with subdivision
plan, where plan was filed and ordinance was adopted 15
years before development permit was sought and
developer had done little in reliance on plan.
No Union Oil Co. of California v. Bd. of County Comm’r of
Clackamas County, 724 P.2d 341, 344 (Or. 1986).
Purchase price of land on which use was contemplated
was properly excluded from substantial expenditure
calculation made to determine whether owner had vested
rights to begin construction after property was rezoned,
absent evidence that owner paid premium as part of
purchase price directly related to contemplated use. There
is no reasonable basis to allow an expenditure that has no
relationship to that use to be considered in determining
whether a vested right to continue the use has been
acquired.
No See also Steuart Petroleum Co. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs
of St. Mary’s County, 347 A.2d 854 (Md. 1975); Boron
Oil Co. v. Kimple, 284 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1971).
Yes Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of Seattle, 745 P.2d
1328 (Wash. 1987). City council violated builder’s vested
rights in using multifamily policies, which were not yet
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adopted when builder applied for permit to construct
tower, and to place condition upon builder’s proposal,
despite fact that multifamily policies were announced and
proposed before builder applied for permit.
The Washington vested rights doctrine protects developers
who file a building permit application that (1) is
sufficiently complete, (2) complies with existing zoning
ordinances and building codes, and (3) is filed during the
effective period of the zoning ordinances under which the
developer seeks to develop. Once a developer complies
with these requirements, a city cannot frustrate the devel-
opment by enacting new zoning regulations.
Note: Washington’s Vesting Statute enacted in 1987
enlarged the protections of the State’s common law
doctrine. See Greg Overstreet and Diana Kirchheim, The
Quest for the Best Test to Vest: Washington’s Vested
Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 Seattle v. Law. Rev.
(Summer, 2000)
Yes State ex rel Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 275 P.2d 899, 902
(Wash. 1954). The property owner’s right to put his
property to a permitted use “accrues at the time an
application for a building permit is made.”
Yes See also: Valley View Industrial Park v. City of Redmond,
733 P.2d 182 (Wash. 1987); West Main Associates v. City
of Bellevue, 720 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1986).
Yes Barker v. County of Forsyth, 281 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 1981).
Court adopts the “probability of issuance” rule, based
upon informal assurances given to the property owner by
county officials to the effect that the proposed use was in
accordance with existing zoning.
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Yes See also: Gallagher v. Building Inspector City of Erie, 247
A.2d 572 (Pa. 1968); Bd. of Zoning Appeals of City of
Fort Wayne v. Shell Oil Co., 329 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. App.
1975); Zaremba Dev. Co. v. City of Fairview Park, 616
N.E.2d 569 (Ohio App. 1992).
L. PREVENTION OF BUILDING PERMIT ISSUANCE
(OR PERMIT REVOCATION) DUE TO
GOVERNMENT’S BAD FAITH OR UNLAWFUL
ACTION.
Where government unlawfully or in bad faith delays
issuance of building permit or revokes same, the courts
are split.
No Sycamore Realty Co., Inc. v. People’s Counsel of
Baltimore County, 684 A.2d 1331 (Md. 1996). Developer
filed a development plan for a 220-unit townhouse
complex, which was permitted under applicable zoning.
While the project was under consideration the County
placed the property in reservation for potential future
acquisition and then unlawfully extended the reservation
for an additional year, during which time the property was
down-zoned by nearly half its density as part of a
comprehensive rezoning. However, the County,
acknowledging its mistake, processed the development
application on the basis of the density to which it was
entitled prior to the unlawful extension of the reservation.
The County Board of Appeals and the reviewing lower
court agreed that the County was estopped from enforcing
the new zoning. However, the state’s highest court applied
the state’s late vesting rule, holding that the landowner
had not obtain building permits to erect the townhouse
complex and thus had acquired no vested rights. The court
expressly refused to consider the doctrine of zoning
estoppel.
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No Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 418 A.2d 1155,
1161 (Md. 1980); cert. den. 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
Developer held to have no vested right to continue
construction of an apartment building where building and
sewer permits were revoked (in bad faith per two lower
court opinions), since developer did not first exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies in appealing permit revocations.
[This is a much criticized case. See “Just Compensation of
Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy
in Challenging Land Use Regulations,” 29 U.C.L.A. Law
Review 711, 740-745 (1982)].
No Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291
A.2d 672 (Md. 1972). Building permit issuance delayed
for over a year due to the adjudicated unlawful action of
the Board of Appeals in denying special exception for
concrete batching plant. Nevertheless, change in law
subsequent to reversal of board action by court cut off
applicant’s rights.
No County Council for Montgomery County v. District Land
Corp., 337 A.2d 712, 721 (Md. 1975). Adjudicated
unlawful refusal of sewer agency to approve sewer permit
precluded owner from continuing with construction under
approved building permit. However, a downzoning
following the court’s initial ruling terminated the owner’s
right to continue.
No Gramiger v. County of Pitkin, 794 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Col.
App. 1989). County’s wrongful withholding of building
permit for a restaurant prior to zoning amendment deleting
restaurants as a permitted use in the zone did not give rise
to vested right because the owner failed to present
evidence that he would have taken substantial steps to
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complete the structure before the amendment became
effective.
Yes Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 390
(Neb. 1994), supra, Section K. Planning commission,
planning director and council found to have delayed action
and hearing on landowner’s application for a land-use
permit in order to allow the neighborhood representative’s
later filed request for rezoning of landowner’s property to
be reviewed and passed. Such delays were arbitrary and in
bad faith in order to prevent landowner’s intended use,
rather than reasonable and in good faith to promote the
general welfare. Therefore, the new regulation may not be
applied retroactively. (Damages awarded to Whitehead
Oil, based upon a partial taking, in a companion case,
Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401
(Neb. 1994).
Yes Hock Investment Company, Inc. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 263 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1989) If approving agency made an express promise that
owner’s application for conversion to condominium would
be evaluated under the ordinance in effect at the date of
submittal, and owner reasonably relied upon that promise
to its significant detriment by filing its application prior to
notice of any proposed change in the ordinance, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel would prevent the city from
applying the new ordinance, which put a three-year
moratorium on conversions.
Yes State ex rel. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. City of
Louisiana, 734 S.W.2d 890, 896 (Mo. 1987). Where city
officials were consulted early and reassured store
proprietor that nothing would prevent operation of store
on any property acquired in city, city was equitably
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estopped from denying issuance of building permit for
construction of store.
Yes PMC Realty Trust v. Town of Derry, 480 A.2d 51, 54
(N.H 1984). Bad faith enactment of a zoning ordinance for
purpose of preventing a legal use by an applicant for a
building permit may confer vested rights on the applicant.
Yes See also Dubow v. Ross, 3 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div.
1938).
M. ISSUANCE OF BUILDING PERMIT, WITHOUT
COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION
Courts are generally split as to whether the issuance of a
building permit alone, without commencement of
construction, will be enough to vest the permittee’s right
to continue in the face of a change in law. A slight
majority inclines toward no vesting.
See 1 Anderson, The American Law of Zoning, § 6.26 (4th
Ed. 1996); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.156
(3d ed. 1991).
No Lakeview Development Corp. v. City of South Lake
Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1298 (9th Cir. 1990). No vested
right to proceed where townhouse developer held building
permits over a 12-year period without commencing
construction, and ordinance amendment placed new
restrictions on development.
No Cymbidium Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 519 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987); app. den. 524 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1988). City
was not estopped from enforcing zoning amendment
limiting development to 8 stories against developers who
obtained permit to build 13 story building under existing
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zoning, but who did not carry out necessary foundation
work so as to acquire a vested interest.
No City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 509
So.2d 1295 (Fla. 1987). Zoning authority was not
equitably estopped from repealing special height
exception granted to property owner for construction of
building, where owner made no real effort to construct the
building and did not incur extensive obligations.
No Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 51 A.2d
273, 279 (Md. 1947). “The mere issuance of a permit
where the permittee has not commenced the work or
incurred substantial face on the faith of it does not create a
vested right.”
No Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 67 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1954). No vested right to proceed with a commercial
parking lot was recognized where the permittee had notice
of a pending ordinance change when the building permit
was obtained.
No See also Palatine I v. Planning Board of the Township of
Montville, 628 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1993).
Yes Gulf Oil Corp. v. Township Bd. of Spvsrs, 266 A.2d 84
(Pa. 1970). Corporation which had purchased land one
week after issuance of a building permit held to have
vested rights where the subsequently enacted restrictive
zoning ordinance was not pending or known of at the time
of purchase.
Yes Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 170 S.E.2d 904 (N.C.
1969). Purchase of land after issuance of a building
permit, followed by purchase of equipment for a dry
cleaning plant and entering into a contract for
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construction, held to have vested the owner’s right to
continue in the face of a restrictive ordinance amendment.
N. “CONSTRUCTION” FOLLOWING ISSUANCE OF
A BUILDING PERMIT
Determination of what constitutes “commencement of
construction” can be a vexing issue. A few scenarios will
be treated here.
1.  Clearing of Land/Site Preparation
No Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Development Co., 623
A.2d 1296 (Md. 1993). Construction of a concrete footing
for apartment building was insufficient to vest rights
where the developers only building permit was for the
column footings. Construction must proceed under the
permit so that the neighborhood may be advised that the
land is being devoted to the planned use.
No Landquest, Inc. v. Planning Board of Hoosick, 538 N.Y.S.
2d 666 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1989) Where 15 lots were to be de-
veloped, costing approximately $675,000, developer,
holding building permits for all 15 lots, acquired no vested
rights to build because rough grading of the parcel, install-
ing a gravel roadway servicing 12 of the lots, and starting
construction of one two-family residence on one lot, cost-
ing $35,000, were neither substantial construction under-
taken nor substantial expense incurred, both of which
were required to vest rights. In the interim, planning
board, which had previously expressed objections in an
advisory capacity, had been granted authority to pass on
plats already filed of subdivisions on which 20% or more
of the lots were unimproved, and sought to review the
subdivision.
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No Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San
Francisco, 750 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988). City ordinance, re-
quiring all building owners within downtown area to pay
special assessment for maintenance of city mass transit
system, was not retroactively applied in violation of
vested rights doctrine to office buildings currently under
construction. The new buildings, which had begun
construction before the ordinance was enacted, contained
a clause in the building permit that owners agreed to
belong to special assessment district for maintenance of
augmentation of city’s transit system.
No Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Manganiello, 213 N.Y.S.2d
617, 622 (Sup. Ct. 1961). A single day’s work on grading
and providing access roads was held not to have vested the
developer’s right to continue.
No Verner v. Redman, 271 P.2d 468 (Ariz. 1954). Demolition
of an existing building and excavation work held not to
have vested the developer’s right to continue.
No F.L.D. Construction Corp. v. Walsh, 357 N.Y.S.2d 112
(App. Div. 1974). Clearing of land in preparation for a
trailer park held not to have vested developer’s right to
continue.
Yes Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 665 N.E.2d 1061 (N.Y.
1996). After the landowner obtained a building permit for
a 184,000 square feet industrial building and expended
over $4 million on site development and improvements,
intensified citizen opposition led the Town to revoke the
permit, halt construction, and amend the zoning code to
preclude construction of commercial buildings on the
subject site. (Although the permit was limited to “land
clearing, footings, and foundations,” the court treated it as
entitling the landowner to construct the the entire building
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so long as subsequent work on ceilings, walls and
electrical comported with plans already approved by the
building inspector.) Ruling that a vested right can be
acquired when, pursuant to a legally issued permit, the
landowner demonstrates a commitment to the purpose for
which the permit was granted by effecting substantial
changes and incurring substantial expenses to further the
development, the court found that the owner’s right to
develop had vested, thus establishing a protected property
interest. Accordingly, the Town’s actions denied the
landowner substantive due process of the law, and an
award for over $5 million in damages to the landowner
under 42. U.S.C. § 1983 was upheld.
Yes Deer Park Civic Assn. v. City of Chicago, 106 N.E.2d 823
(Ill. App. 1952). Court uses a balancing test to uphold
owner’s vested right to continue development where a
building permit had been issued for a manufacturing use
in the face of a pending ordinance amendment to change
the zoning of the property to residential. The permittee’s
expenditures ($22,000) and contracts (approximately
$600,000) although antedating the permit’s issuance were
held sufficient to vest the owner’s rights under a balancing
analysis.
2.  Pouring of Footings Pursuant to a Validly Issued
Building Permit and Continued Good-Faith Pursuit of
Construction Work will Vest the Permittee’s Right as
Against a Change in the Law.
No Palatine I v. Planning Board of the Township of
Montville, 628 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1993). Commencing
construction of the central core and one wing of a 60,000-
square-foot office building pursuant to site plan approval
and a building permit did not give rise to an equitable
estoppel claim against the Township when construction on
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the second wing was suspended for over a year and in the
interim new zoning regulations had been enacted reducing
the permitted size of the office building to 45,000 square
feet. Both the original site plan and the building permit
were deemed to have expired in view of the work
stoppage for over six months.
No Ross v. Montgomery County, 250 A.2d 635 (Md. 1969).
Pouring of a single $190 footing for a $1.8 million apart-
ment hotel on the last day of the permit’s life, followed by
termination of all further construction activity, held not to
be a good-faith commencement of construction.
(Permittee had demolished three buildings worth
approximately $75,000, performed test borings and
incurred $56,000 of expenses in preparing the building
permit application.)
No HWK, Inc. v. County of Kendall, 621 N.E.2d 246
(Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1993). A building permit acquired by
permittees to construct a cement plant did not extend to
property acquired by the permittees after permit was
issued.
No See also Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Development
Co., supra, Section N1.; Prince George’s County v. Blum-
berg, supra, Section L.
Yes Aransonian Oil Co. v. City of Portsmouth, 612 A.2d 357
(N.H. 1992). City was estopped from enjoining the
operation of a convenience store where the owner, relying
on an issued building permit, incurred $45,000 in
remodeling costs.
Yes Kolesar v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Bell Acres,
543 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1988). Operator of automobile repair
and towing business was entitled to a variance by estoppel
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allowing him to continue operation of business in a resi-
dential zone. Substantial evidence supported conclusion
that operator showed due diligence and good faith
throughout the proceedings, and that operator made
substantial expenditures in reliance on building permits
previously granted for garage building out of which
business operated.
Yes Jaffee v. RCI Corp., 500 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1986). Company
which obtained necessary approval of town planning
board pursuant to law then in effect and lawfully
completed construction of transmission tower acquired
vested rights which were not affected by subsequent
amendment of zoning ordinance which eliminated
transmission towers as permitted use. Furthermore,
company which constructed transmission tower and then
agreed to remove tower if town planning board’s approval
was annulled did not waive vested rights acquired by
obtaining necessary approval pursuant to law then in
effect.
Yes Pemberton v. Montgomery County, 340 A.2d 240 (Md.
1975). Obtaining a building permit and pouring of
footings for a retaining wall for a gas station on the last
day of the life of a special exception, followed by
continued construction activity, held to be good-faith
commencement of construction even though the footing
was poured in the wrong location. The court laid out a
two-step test for determining commencement of
construction, as follows:
“[T]here must be (i) a manifest commencement of some
work or labor on the ground which everyone can readily
see and recognize as the commencement ... and (ii) the
work done must have been begun with the intention and
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purpose to continue the work until completion of the
building ...” (Id. at 244.)
Note: The fact that the gasoline station was completed by
the time the case was heard by the court may have in-
fluenced the outcome based upon an “economic waste”
theory.
Yes Emerald Home Builders, Inc. v. Kolton, Jr., 298 N.E.2d
275 (Ill. App. 1973). Vested rights in a building permit
were recognized where the city in bad faith first ordered
the permittee to stop construction and then, six months
and one day later, revoked the building permit for lack of
construction activity.
O. INVALID OR UNLAWFULLY ISSUED BUILDING
PERMIT
1.  Generally, the holder of a building permit which is
unlawfully or mistakenly issued obtains no vested right in
same, even where construction has occurred. See
8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §25.153 (3rd Ed.
1991).
No McClure v. Davidson, 373 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. 1988). Illegal
building permit issued to landowners after their
subsequent expenditures on property did not give them
vested right to develop property. Issuance of a building
permit results in a vested right only when permit is legal
and valid.
No Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 519 N.E.2d
1372 (N.Y. 1988). City was not estopped from revoking
that portion of property owner’s building permit which
violated long standing zoning limits, although property
owner had already engaged in substantial construction in
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reliance thereon; where property owner could have
discovered city’s error in issuance of building permit by
reasonable diligence in examining enabling legislation.
No Gunkel v. City of Emporia, 835 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.
1987). Kansas state law does not recognize property rights
in building permits which have been issued by mistake or
in violation of state law. Once a permit is found to have
been issued by mistake or in violation of the law, the city
may revoke it without notice of hearing.
No City of Lamoni v. Livingston, 392 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa
1986). Property owner, who was erroneously issued
building permit for construction of sawmill when zoning
ordinance did not allow that use in district, and who
continued to build after receiving notice of revocation of
permit, did not have vested right in permit which would
prevent its being revoked by city.
No Miller v. Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Dewey Beach,
521 A.2d 642 (Del. 1986). Property owner did not acquire
any vested rights in erroneously issued building permits as
a result of moving to cottages in reliance thereon.
Generally, permit issued illegally or in violation of the law
does not confer vested right upon person to whom it is
issued.
No Center Township v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Center
Township, 522 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1987). Mere delay in
enforcement of zoning ordinance does not create a vested
right in an “established” unlawful use of property in
violation of zoning regulations.
No Dege v. City of Maplewood, 416 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.
1987). City was not estopped from enforcing terms of
special use permit allowing customer parking but
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prohibiting truck or trailer storage in parking lot by
revoking building permit issued to landowner for
construction of a trailer garage on parking lot. Since
landowner was charged with constructive notice of special
use permit, it was unreasonable for him to claim reliance
on building permit issued in violation of special use
permit.
No LaFollette v. Board of Adjustment of City of Lakewood,
741 P.2d 1262 (Col. 1987). Where applicant applied for
building permit for “storage barn” in zoning area that
permitted barns used for agricultural purposes, but
application made no mention of what he planned to store,
permit issued was not a communication that unmistakably
misled applicant into believing the city approved storage
of excavating equipment on site. Thus, city was not
estopped from subsequently claiming that use of structure
for such storage was in violation of zoning ordinance.
No Township of West Pikeland v. Thornton, 527 A.2d 174
(Pa. 1987). Landowner cannot acquire a vested right in
permit issued by local government by reliance on
statements of appointee, such as chairman of zoning
hearing board, who acted merely as ministerial officer
rather than in adjudicative capacity. A landowner making
expenditures for construction in reliance on those
statements does so at his own peril.
No See also City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp., 578 N.E.2d
194 (Ill. App. 1991); Randolph Vine Assoc. v. Zoning
Bd., 573 A.2d 255 (Pa. Commw. 1990); Glazer v. Zoning
Bd. of Worcester, 423 A.2d 463 (Pa. Commw. 1980);
Flood v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Hampden Township, 338
A.2d 789 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
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2.  A minority of courts recognize vested rights in
unlawfully/mistakenly issued permits where there is
evidence of good faith and due diligence coupled with
substantial expenditures by the permittee.
Yes Koziel v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Waynesboro,
551 A.2d 383 (Pa. 1988) For property owners whose
combined income was $47,000, the expenditure of $2,000
in modifying property pursuant to an erroneously issued
building permit constituted substantial, unrecoverable
sums, as required for them to acquire vested rights in use
of property.
Yes Jones v. City of Aurora, 772 P.2d 645 (Colo. App. 1988)
Doctrine of equitable estoppel applied to prevent city from
claiming that property was not zoned for day-care center
after city employee told prospective buyer that property
for sale was zoned for that use, despite fact that
prospective buyer gave employee the incorrect address (as
supplied to him by the seller). Buyer justifiably relied on
city’s zoning representation in purchasing the property,
and equitable relief was appropriate because city was in a
superior position to discover the true facts giving rise to
the action.
Yes Nowak v. Bridgeville Borough Zoning Bd., 534 A.2d 165
(Pa. 1987). Property owner acquired a vested right in
garage building permit issued in violation of zoning ordi-
nance’s side yard setback requirements. Although the gen-
eral rule in Pennsylvania is that illegal building permits
confer no vested rights, if the facts of a case so dictate, the
vested rights doctrine may be applied as an exception to
the general rule. Here, the property owner exhibited due
diligence in attempting to comply with the law, acted in
good faith throughout the proceedings, and completed
90% of construction at the time the permit was revoked.
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Therefore, the property owner acquired vested rights in
the building permit.
Yes J. & B. Dev. Co. v. King County, 669 P.2d 468 (Wash.
1983). “There is nothing discretionary about the duty [of
the County to exercise reasonable care in issuing building
permits and conducting inspections]. The response is in
the nature of a ‘ministerial’ or ‘operational’ function; one
which each member of the public has a right to expect will
be made accurately.” (Id. at 474.)
Yes Abberville Arms v. City of Abberville, 257 S.E.2d 716
(S.C. 1979). A property owner’s reliance upon informal
city approvals (based upon city officials’ mistaken
impression of the zoning status of the subject property)
gave rise to vested rights where the property owner had
made substantial expenditures pursuant to the permit.
Yes Commonwealth Dept. of Environmental Resources v.
Flynn, 344 A.2d 720 (Pa. Commw. 1975). Property owner
who had spent $50,000 toward construction of personal
residence, which was 75% complete, held to have
obtained a vested right to continue even though permit had
been issued in error. The court was persuaded by the due
diligence and good faith of the property owner, the
expenditure involved, the nature of the improvement, and
the expiration of the period in which any appeal could
have been filed.
Yes See also Aranosian Oil Company Inc. v. City of Ports-
mouth, 612 A.2d 357 (N.H. 1992), supra, § N 2.
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P. CONSTRUCTION WHILE COURT CHALLENGE IS
PENDING
Generally, one who proceeds with construction in the face
of a court challenge to his permit is deemed to have
proceeded at his own risk and will not be accorded vested
rights in the event of a subsequent court reversal.
Determination of these cases often depends upon the good
faith of the challenger (i.e., was the challenged project
allowed to continue for an undue length of time before the
appeal was noted), the good faith of the permittee; and
local statute. The filing of an appeal will in some
jurisdictions by statute stay the permittee’s right to
proceed. In other jurisdictions, one desiring to challenge
an approved project must post a bond or risk having the
appeal become moot in the event the challenged
construction proceeds to completion during the pendency
of the appeal.
No Conneen v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 568 A.2d 700 (Pa.
Cmwlth 1989). Building was held not to be “lawful”
where owner obtained building permit and constructed the
building pursuant to a variance after trial court upheld
zoning hearing board’s variance, but before appellate
court reversed. Owner was not entitled to benefit of
nonconforming use provision of ordinance which was
amended after the construction but before appeal was
decided because owner had “built at his own risk” by
obtaining building permit and constructing with
knowledge that an appeal had been taken.
No Grandview Baptist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
of City of Davenport, 301 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1981). To
allow the permittee to obtain vested rights in these
circumstances would render the appeal process
meaningless.
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Yes Petty v. Barrentine, 594 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. App. 1980).
Court upholds permittee’s right to continue in view of the
circumstances of the case and its analysis of the lis
pendens doctrine in relation thereto.
Yes Goto v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917
(D.C. 1980). Laches held to bar intervenor from pursuing
zoning violation claim against property owner.
Q. STAGED/SEQUENTIAL LARGE-SCALE
DEVELOPMENTS
As stated in the text of this article, traditional late vesting
tests are inappropriate in cases involving large-scale
developments.
It is in this area most of all that a new standard - one
not anchored to building permits - is needed. Clearly, the
“use” in a large-scale development is established long be-
fore the last building permit is issued. Equally clear is the
existence of numerous governmental actions in the
development chronology upon which substantial reliance
has been placed by the developer.
A.  The following cases are illustrative of the problem and
provide some hint as to possible solutions.
No Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n., et al. v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105, S. Ct.
3108 (1985).
This case involved a major reduction of development
rights for a large planned unit development by way of
intervening regulations substantially reducing density,
enacted several years after initial zoning approval. The de-
veloper had spent approximately $3.5 million for
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improvements, including a golf course and sewer and
water facilities. The principal issues presented to the court
involved whether a compensable “taking” of the
developer’s property under the Fifth Amendment had
occurred and whether the developer was entitled to relief
under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The Supreme
Court declined to address the taking issue, finding that the
case was not ripe in view of the fact that no variance had
been sought by the developer from either the County
Board of Appeals or Planning Commission.
However, it is important to note that the issue of vested
rights was a significant component of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
favor of the developer [729 F.2d 402 (1984)], which was
reversed by the Supreme Court. The issue of vested rights
receives only peripheral comment in the Supreme Court’s
opinion. One may conclude from the court’s opinion that
in addition to requiring that exhaustion of administrative
remedies and state judicial remedies must occur before a
Fifth Amendment taking claim will be considered in
Federal Court, substantive questions of vested rights must
also give way to technical procedural deficiencies.
Support for this view may also be found in United States
v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1797 (1985).
No Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast
Regional Comm., 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976). Avco, owner
and developer of a large (5,000-acre) planned unit
development, was held not to have achieved vested rights
regarding a 74-acre parcel designated for multiple-family
use, even though the PUD had been approved years before
and nearly $2.8 million had been expended or obligated by
Avco in planning and site improvements, including the
conveyance of parkland to the county at a below-market
price. The court’s ruling that Avco had no vested right to
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continue was based upon the traditional vesting rule that
work performed and liabilities incurred must be pursuant
to a building permit. However, the court’s analysis is
seriously flawed, in that cases cited in support of its
decision involved conventional single-building
developments, such as an apartment building site in one
instance and a gas station in another. The court’s reaction
was that there were only “minor factual variations”
between Avco’s PUD and these prior cases.
No Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 649 F.
Supp. 926 (D. Haw. 1986). Although developer spent over
$8 million in building a large hotel/ resort complex,
developer held to have no vested rights in the property.
Court stated that developer had the right, but not the
obligation, to develop property at its own expense and
risk. The investment represented a business risk
undertaken by the developer, and he could not turn a
contract right into a property right simply by investing in
the subject matter of the contract. (Affirmed Kaiser Dev.
Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 898 F.2d 112 (9th
Cir. 1990). Further unpublished opinion at 899 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1990)).
No Landquest, Inc. v. Planning Board of Hoosick, 538
N.Y.S.2d 666 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1989.
Yes Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, 650 P.2d 963 (Or.
App. 1982). Developer of 440 acre planned unit
development vested its right to complete the development,
based upon approval of the original PUD plan, notwith-
standing fact that developer later sought and obtained
approval of a revised PUD plan.
Yes In Re Diamond’s Appeal, 196 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1964). The
time to challenge the validity of an integrated mixed-use
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plan is at the time of issuance of the initial permit
implementing the plan. Thus, a court challenge of the
commercial portion of the development, filed more than
two years after the rezoning was approved and
construction of residential areas commenced, was not
allowed. The development, even though accomplished in
stages, may be considered as a single entity for the
purpose of vesting rights if it is so planned and presented.
Yes Preseault v. Wheel, 315 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1974), supra,
which, although not a large-scale development, stands for
the premise that development work related to the entire
project (as opposed to only the completed portion) may be
sufficient to vest the developer’s right to complete.
B. At least one court has recognized that traditional
vesting tests may be inapplicable to large-scale
developments.
In Rockshire Civic Assn., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of
Rockville, 358 A.2d 570, (Md. 1976), the court noted:
“[T]he question of vested or contract rights in planned
residential unit development is an interesting and difficult
question, which will no doubt return to the Courts of this
State .... While it is entirely clear that in conventional
zoning applications, the property owner acquires no vested
interest in the continuation of existing zoning, in the
absence of improvement of the property pursuant to such
zoning, it is equally true that we are not dealing with the
conventional zoning. The landowner invariably dedicates
to the public use substantial amounts of valuable property,
and improves other areas in a manner perhaps not most
desirable to him, in return for the privilege of more
intensive development, or commercial development, in
other areas of the tract. Reduction of the initially approved
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/24
p603+Delaney.doc 01/04/01
2000] Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology 661
Vested
Rights?
commercial areas would clearly result in financial
detriment to the owner of the property, but unless it would
deprive the owner of all reasonable use of his property,
such action may not be constitutionally impermissible.”
(Id. at 579. Emphasis added.)
However, it should be noted that the decision in Rockshire
was based primarily upon a grandfather statute which
allowed the challenged portion of the PUD (a commercial
use) to stay intact.
No C.  One of the most significant vested rights and
referendum cases involving large-scale developments is
County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co.,
653 P.2d 766 (Ha. 1982).
The case is important in several respects:
1.  Where the piecemeal rezoning proceeding is deemed to
be legislative, rather than quasi-judicial, the risk of the
referendum/ initiative process being invoked in any
controversial case must be taken into account.
a.  See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 217 A.2d
578 (Md. 1966), and Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’rs,
507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973), for espousal of the concept that
the piecemeal rezoning proceeding is “quasi-judicial” in
character.
2.  Once a referendum petition is certified, i.e., approved
for placement on the ballot, the referendum itself - not the
building permit - becomes the final discretionary act in the
permitting process.
3.  The developer in Kauai, who began construction the
day after the referendum was held (but three weeks before
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the results of the referendum were certified), assumed
known risks and could make no claim of vesting or
equitable estoppel.
a.  Note, the building permits themselves had been
previously held to have been validly issued. Nevertheless,
in the circumstances of the referendum, the building
permit was not the final discretionary act in the permitting
process.
4.  Although at the time of the court’s decision, several
condominium buildings in the resort project had been
completed and sold and a hotel was partially completed,
the court in remanding directed that demolition of the
buildings would not be an appropriate remedy, absent a
showing of intent to violate the county’s zoning laws.
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